Общество "Россия-Япония":
http://ru-jp.org/

Valery Glushkov
Professor of History, Academy of Russian Encyclopaedias

THERE WERE NO WINNERS IN THE 1904-1905 RUSSIAN-JAPANESE WAR!

The Peace Treaty between Russia and Japan signed on August 23 (according to the old calendar) 1905 at the conference in Portsmouth (New Hampshire, US) ended the 1904-1905 war between the two countries, a war whose toll in human lives exceeded 50,000, that left 200,000 people wounded, mutilated and sick, that required 2.3 billion golden rubles in direct costs alone, and that became the forerunner of the devastating upheavals that followed. Japan suffered as much. [1]

Almost one hundred years later, the argument about the expediency of the Portsmouth Peace is still going on, with one side claiming that the victory was simply stolen from the Russians, while the other side trying to prove that Russia had sustained a defeat that made the armistice and the peace accord both timely and necessary. For some reasons, both sides ignore the fact that the parties to the Portsmouth Conference were not the victor and the vanquished, but representatives of two countries still at war. The document signed there was not an act of unconditioned capitulation, with one side conceding its complete and final defeat, but a treaty ensuring peace between the opponents. [2]

But let us consider the facts: Indeed, after several reversals on land and at sea, which culminated in the surrender of Port Arthur and the devastating (for the Russians) Battle of Mukden, the number of optimists who believed that the war might take a turn for the good of Russia dropped considerably.

On February 28, 1905, Russian Emperor Nikolai II was informed of a memorandum submitted by the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers and State Secretary S. Yu. Witte (who was out of favor at the time), proposing that "negotiations with Japan on conditions of peace be initiated." Witte believed that continuing the war was becoming dangerous and that "given the present state of its morale, the country would not be able to sustain further victims without a frightening catastrophe… Russia will lose [foreign] credit… Procrastination is impossible…" [3]

Witte never received a reply to his memorandum. Meanwhile, cadre replacements were effected in Manchuria: General of the Infantry A. N. Kuropatkin was replaced, by the emperor's order of March 5, with General of the Infantry N. P. Linevich as commander in chief of the Russian armed forces in the Far East. The replacement of the CIC indicated the intention of the Russian emperor to continue the war effort.

Following the Russian defeat at Mukden, the French government, concerned about the outflow of Russian troops to the East and a possible violation of the balance of forces in Europe, attempted to withdraw Russia from the war: the bankers refused a new loan and France's Minister of Foreign Affairs Т. Delcasset {{CHECK}} intimated to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, A. I. Nelidov, that he might play the part of a mediator in a peaceful settlement "if he is asked to do so." The loan, agreed upon earlier, was guaranteed to Russia upon the conclusion of a peaceful accord. Nikolai II pretended to agree to the mediation of the French, but proposed such unacceptable terms to the Japanese that they were totally rejected.[4]

May 14 and 15 saw the Tsushima battle in the Korean Straits, as a result of which the Second Russian Pacific Squadron was buried in the ocean. "After this defeat everybody came to the realization that the war should end with peace," wrote Witte in his memoirs, "and this trend began to manifest itself so strongly that finally it reached the throne. His Majesty [Nikolai II] began to lean toward peace... Alongside our military misfortunes the discord and the revolutionary current continued to grow in strength" [5]. By mid-1905, entire Russia had been paralyzed with the general strike. The glow of the revolution was rising over the country.

Having scored several victories on land and at sea, the Japanese abruptly stopped active military operations. Furthermore, at the same time, the Japanese government began to look for mediators who could help conclude an armistice with Russia. Thus, on May 18, Japan's Foreign Minister D. Komura instructed his envoy to the US to express to American President Theodore Roosevelt "the hope of the Japanese government that… the president find it possible to immediately and wholly on his own initiative to invite the two adversaries to meet for direct negotiations". [6]

On May 23, US President sent a telegram to his ambassador in St. Petersburg, suggesting that he meet Emperor Nikolai II and try to persuade him toward peace. The Russian emperor received the ambassador May 25. Toward the end of the audience, Nikolai II, after some hesitation, gave his consent to negotiations under the condition that the same preliminary consent is forthcoming on the part of the emperor of Japan. Also, he believed that under no circumstances "an impression should arise that Russia is asking for peace." [7]

On May 26, President Roosevelt, in a note addressed simultaneously to Russia and Japan, proposed 'in the interests of mankind" to get together for negotiations in order to put an end to "this horrible and unfortunate struggle." For fairness' sake it should be noted however, that Roosevelt's love of mankind had a "second bottom. " According to the Soviet historian B. A. Romanov, Roosevelt regarded the confrontation between Russia and Japan "as a useful mutual extermination by the two nations, after which this very 'border friction' should be preserved between them; this will keep Russia and Japan in a state of constant antagonism and mutual equilibrium, which will safeguard US supremacy in the Pacific Ocean and, in particular, in the Far East [8].

The peace conference was scheduled to take place in the American maritime resort city of Portsmouth. Witte was appointed to conduct the negotiations on behalf of Russia. Nikolai II received Witte June 30 and said, among other things, that "he sincerely wishes that the negotiations bring about a peaceful solution, but that he cannot allow for any kopeck of indemnity or an inch of land". [9]

Russia's chief representative was briefed about the current situation in the Far Eastern theater of operations by the Chairman of the Council of Defense, Grand Prince Nikolai Nikolayevich (Junior), who "explained in rather good detail the circumstances in his inherently definite language." The essence of his evaluation of the situation consisted in that "our army cannot afford to sustain yet another defeat of the kind it suffered in Liaoyang and Mukden, and that under favorable circumstances and with possible strengthening of our army there is a high likelihood that we be able to push the Japanese till the Quantung Peninsula and into Korea, i. e., beyond the Yala, and that this would probably require about one year of time, one billion rubles in expenses and some 200-250 thousand dead and wounded…, and that we can have no further successes without a navy…and that during this time Japan will occupy Sakhalin and a considerable portion of the Maritime Territory… In any case, it is impossible to agree to the surrender of a single inch of primordial Russian land to the Japanese". [10]

The Japanese high command and, probably, the top officers knew about preparations for an armistice. As for the Russian troops, judging by the testimony of the active combatant and subsequently prominent commander, Lieutenant-General A. I. Denikin, the rumors of a possible peace began to spread from mid-July. "How did the army receive them?" asks the general in his memoirs The Path of a Russian Officer, and goes on "I think I will not be wrong if I say that for the majority of the officers the prospect of returning to one's hearth and home... was strongly overshadowed by the bitterness of a hard, ineffective and, in the consciousness of all concerned, unresolved campaign…

"By the time peace was concluded, the Russian armies in the Sypingai positions included 446,500 troops (there were some 300,000 at Mukden); the troops were positioned in echelons, with more than half of men placed in the general and army reserves, which protected them from eventualities and promised considerable active possibilities; the flanks of the army were reliably protected...; the army received reinforcements, including many young men, and a considerable amount of materiel-howitzer batteries and machine-guns (374 instead of 36), field railroad running stock, wireless telegraphic equipment, etc.; communications with Russia were maintained not by three pairs of trains as in the beginning of the war, but by twelve pairs. Finally, the spirit of the Manchurian armies was not crushed, and trainloads of reinforcements reaching us from Russia were in a lively and merry spirits.

"The Japanese armies confronting us had fewer men by 32 percent. Their country was exhausted. There were old men and children among the prisoners of war. The former high spirits were no longer observed. The fact that after the defeat they had inflicted upon us at Mukden, the Japanese could not resume offensive for six months was testimony of, in the very least, their lack of confidence in their own resourcefulness (the same was later publicly admitted by the Japanese Commander-in-chief Marshal Prince I. Oyama.

"But… our troops were still under the command of many of the same generals who led them at Liaoyang, Shahe, Sandepu and Mukden. Will the past experience be of benefit to them? Will Linevich's headquarters show greater consistence, resolve and authority in relation to generals under its command and more strategic skills than was shown by Kuropatkin? These were the questions that we asked ourselves and, naturally, they caused skepticism in many.

"As for me personally, I, taking into account all 'pros' and 'contras,' without closing my eyes on our miscalculations, gave and will give now only one answer to the question "of what would have been in store for us had we begin an offensive from the Sypingai positions - victory! Russia was far from being defeated. The army was capable of fighting on. But… St. Petersburg was 'tired' of the war more than the army..." [11].

Witte was certainly a vivid representative of the 'tired St. Petersburg.' It was Witte who cut down funding for the Russian armies in the Far East to what could only be described as the 'hunger minimum,' and thereby aroused, willingly or unwillingly, the martial ambitions of Russia's island neighbors; at the time, Witte, looking out of his window in the office of the chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, believed that he had a superior view of the events in Manchuria than the combatants [12]. By the summer of 1905, Witte was bent toward concluding peace under any pretext and on any terms.

Meanwhile, the Russian emperor "was doing everything in his power to ensure the possibility of continuing the war. He… did not consider that Russia had been defeated and, while agreeing to negotiations, bore in mind that they may be broken" [13].

Witte led the Russian delegation to America on July 6; the conference opened July 27. The Japanese presented their terms at the second session. The gist of them was recognition of Japanese domination in Korea; the return of Manchuria to China and the withdrawal of Russian troops; the surrender of Port Arthur and the Liaodung Peninsula as well as Sakhalin and the adjacent islands; the surrender of the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway (Harbin-Port Arthur); the surrender of the Russian ships which found shelter in neutral ports; limits to the right of Russia to maintain a navy in the Far East; the granting to the Japanese of fishery rights near the Russian Pacific coast; and the reimbursement of Japan's military expenditure (no less tat 1,200 million yen).

The declaration of the Japanese peace terms at the conference that was described as one "without either winners or vanquished" caused a considerable shift in American public opinion, which learned that not Russia, but Japan laid claims to the virtual capture of Korea and that "it conquered Port Arthur for itself, not to frustrate the aggressions." President Roosevelt, however, considered the Japanese conditions acceptable. [14]

The following terms put forth by Japan were accepted rather soon: on Korea (with reservations on the rights of the Korean emperor); on Port Arthur (with the reservation that China should agreed to it); on the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria (the Russian and the Japanese were to withdraw at the same time); on the Chinese Eastern Railway (with the shortening of the northern section of the railroad that was to be handed over to Japanese control by 250 versts south of Harbin); and on fisheries. The Russian delegation rejected the other conditions outright.

By August 5, it had become clear that the conference was stalemated and on the verge of collapse. Its participants "had packed and unpacked their suitcases" twice already. The Russian emperor believed that continuation of the war "was still… more acceptable than a disgraceful peace, when one's faith in one's self, in one's Fatherland would be totally crushed." [15]. For his part, the Japanese emperor insisted, through his envoys, that the conditions proposed earlier be accepted.

President Roosevelt, fearing the negotiations "might end in nothing" and result in serious damage for his reputation, decided to get the peace concluded at any cost. He proposed a compromise whereby Japan should occupy the southern half of the Sakhalin (up to the 50th parallel), while Russia will pay it a considerable amount of money for the return of the northern part. In this way, Japan would get what it wanted, while Russia's self esteem would be spared. It was with this proposal that the US ambassador came to see Emperor Nikolai II. "The sovereign said that Russia would not pay indemnity in any form," wrote Russian historian Professor S. S. Oldenburg, "That Russia was not a defeated nation; that it is not in the position that France found itself in 1870; and that he himself would go to the battlefield should there be a need." Emperor Nikolai II did not rule out, however, that "as an extreme concession, he was prepared to surrender the southern part of Sakhalin" under specific conditions. It was a gesture to "show his readiness to meet the American president halfway" [16].

On August 16, the Russian delegation announced its proposals: it rejected claims for indemnities, agreeing only to pay for the upkeep of the Russian prisoners-of-war in Japan; it ceded the southern part of Sakhalin with all the adjacent islands under the condition that Japan returns the northern part without any compensation and assumes the obligation not to build any fortifications on the island and guarantee free passage through the Straits of La Perouse for Russian ships; it rejected the proposal to surrender its naval vessels in neutral ports as well as any restrictions on the number of Russian naval vessels in the Far East; and, finally, it insisted on the complete and simultaneous withdrawal of troops from Manchuria. "The Russian envoys have the honor to declare that, by the order of their august ruler, this is the final concession that Russia is prepared to make with the sole objective of arriving at an agreement," read the statement [17].

After a short silence, the head of the Japanese delegation, Foreign Minister Baron D. Komura "speaking in a steady voice, announced that the Japanese government, in order to restore peace, accepts these conditions! Those present, Witte included, were overwhelmed. No one expected the Japanese to give up their claims for indemnity and agree to return half of the island they have captured without any compensation! Witte regained the control of the situation rather fast and, in a conversation with the journalists, aptly ascribed the success to himself. In the meantime, the unexpected decision of the Japanese only showed that the sovereign appraised the chances of the two sides much more correctly. His readiness to continue the hostilities was real whereas the Japanese were bluffing. Japan was more exhausted than Russia [18].

Indeed, according to the estimate of the well-known German economist and statesman K. Helfferich, Russia with its golden reserves could have waged the war for at least one more year, whereas Japan's reserves were eight times lower [19]. The American analyst T. Dennet {CHECK} was even more categorical when he wrote in 1925 that "Japan had been quite exhausted even by late May, and the conclusion of peace saved it from collapse or utter defeat in the confrontation with Russia" [20].

The protocol on armistice was signed August 19, and the peace treaty, on august 23. Signing for Russia was Chairman of the Committee of Ministers Witte and Ambassador to the US R. R. Rosen, for the Japanese side the treaty was certified by Foreign Minister D. Komura and Envoy to the US K. Takahira. Ratification of the treaty was expected to take place within one month after the signing.

Lulled by victorious reports from the theater of operations, the Japanese people expected anything but such a peace. When the terms of the treaty appeared in the press and everyone could see that they were closer to the Russian peace program, Japan was swept with a wave of strong agitation: flags of mourning were displayed in towns, barricades were built in the streets, houses were set on fire, martial law was introduced in Tokyo, and troops were called in. There were casualties-dead and wounded [21].

Japan's acceptance of the his peace terms caught the Russian emperor by surprise that was as unexpected to him as it was to the participants in the peace conference (the only difference being that Nikolai II wished them rejected). According to high-placed witnesses, both he and the empress did not conceal their very low spirits. After all, it was the time when "our army was building up its strength and martial fortune might, at last, smile upon us". [22]

S. Witte was given the title of count for concluding the peace treaty. Baron D. Komura, upon return to Japan, fell in disfavor with the emperor and his court. Not only did he get no award, but was forced to give up his post of foreign minister and retire to private life, developing a serious nervous condition.

The Portsmouth Peace produced a very grim effect on the Russian military. "Not one of the misfortunes we suffered affected our army in so detrimental a fashion as this untimely peace before victory," wrote in his diary the commander of the First Manchurian Army, general A. N. Kuropatkin. [23]

One month after the conclusion of the peace accord, indignant A. N. Kuropatkin wrote to the War Minister Lieutenant-General A. F. Rediger, "As for public opinion, I deem it necessary to inform you that initially we in the army heeded St. Petersburg's public opinion, then were confused by it, and ultimately regarded it with indignation. History will reveal who was right, but the shameful Portsmouth Peace is largely the outcome of the so-called public opinion… Resentment against Witte in the army is great… Undoubtedly, the Japanese would have concluded peace even without half of Sakhalin, would have done so in view of the positions we occupy at present... I am writing to you… because my views are shared by the army people, and one has to reckon with this". [24]

Thus, peace was restored. Russia did not win in the war, but neither had it lost, for according to international law, only a state which signs an act of unconditional capitulation is considered defeated. A peace accord was concluded that ended bloodshed on certain conditions. It follows that, in legal terms, it is not correct to interpret Russia's devastating defeats in the last battles (Mukden and Tsushima) as an utter defeat in the war, as is still done [25], As the well-known Russian historian K. F. Shatsillo stresses in his fundamental work that "serious as they were, these defeats did not pose a threat to the colossal empire whose potential was far from being exhausted. Only the navy suffered a total defeat, but the Manchurian army had retained its combat capabilities and was a force that the Japanese military had to count with. This was what induced the Japanese to make minimal claims which satisfied the war-exhausted Japan at the conclusion of the Portsmouth peace [26].

Japan experienced Russia's might at the very moment when it was preparing to enjoy the fruit of its military successes. Indeed, the triumphal passage of the mikado's armies across Manchuria might culminate in an irreparable catastrophe. The only way out of that situation was an armistice through the mediation of a third party. This was accomplished thanks to the efforts of the Japanese and American sides. As a result, Japan preserved its prestige, America preserved its influence on Japan, and Russia remained a great power in the Far East.

References

[1] Ольденбург С.С. Царствование императора Николая II. Изд. третье, "Петрополь", СПб., 1991. С. 199.
[2] Глушков В.В., Шаравин А.А. Ни победы, ни поражения. Исход русско-японской войны 1904-1905 гг. до сих пор не получил однозначной оценки. "Независимое военное обозрение" № 36, 29 сентября - 5 октября 2000 г. С. 5.
[3] Витте С.Ю. Воспоминания. Том 2 (1894 - октябрь 1905). Царствование Николая II. Изд. социально - экономической литературы. М., 1960. С. 573-575.
[4] История внешней политики России. Конец XIX - начало XX века (От русско-французского союза до Октябрьской революции). М., Международные отношения, 1999. С. 177.
[5] Витте С.Ю. Указ. соч. С. 387.
[6] Витте С.Ю. Указ. соч. С. 391.
[7] Ольденбург С.С. Указ. соч. С. 282.
[8] Романов Б.А. Очерки дипломатической истории русско-японской войны. 1895-1907 гг. Изд. Академии наук СССР, М., Л., 1955. С. 6.
[9] Витте С.Ю. Указ. соч. С. 395-396.
[10] Витте С.Ю. Указ. соч. С. 397.
[11] Деникин А.И. Путь русского офицера. Изд. второе, "Прометей", М., 1990. С. 155-158.
[12] Глушков В.В., Шаравин А.А. На карте Генерального штаба - Маньчжурия. Накануне русско-японской войны 1904-1905 гг. Изд. Института политического и военного анализа, М., 2000. С. 63-65.
[13] Ольденбург С.С. Указ. соч. С. 290, 296.
[14] Ольденбург С.С. Указ. соч. С. 295.
[15] Ольденбург С.С. Указ. соч. С. 296.
[16] Ольденбург С.С. Указ. соч. С. 296-297.
[17] Ольденбург С.С. Указ. соч. С. 297.
[18] Ольденбург С.С. Указ. соч. С. 297-298.
[19] Ольденбург С.С. Указ. соч. С 298.
[20] Ольденбург С.С. Указ. соч. С. 299.
[21] Ольденбург С.С. Указ. соч. С. 299.
[22] Ольденбург С.С. Указ. соч. С. 300.
[23] Ольденбург С.С. Указ. соч. С. 304.
[24] Ильина Н.В. Накануне первой русской революции (Из переписки русских военных деятелей А.Н. Куропаткина и А.Ф. Редигера в 1905 г.) // Военно-исторический журнал, № 6, 1991. С. 93-95.
[25] В основу официальной точки зрения о поражении России в войне с Японией положено не международное право и юриспруденция, а статьи В.И. Ульянова (Ленина) "Падение Порт-Артура" и "Разгром"", где соответственно отмечается следующее: "Не русский народ, а самодержавие пришло к позорному поражению..." (Ленин В.И. Падение Порт-Артура // Полное собрание сочинений. Издание 5-е, том 9, М., Политиздат, 1977. С. 158), "Русский военный флот окончательно уничтожен. Война проиграна бесповоротно... Перед нами не только военное поражение, а полный военный крах самодержавия" (Ленин В.И. Разгром // Полное собрание сочинений. Издание 5-е, том 10, М., Политиздат, 1977. С. 252). Надо заметить, что через 90 с лишним лет после выхода в свет этих статей "дело Ленина живет и побеждает". Так, в учебнике по истории военного искусства для слушателей Военной академии Генерального штаба ВС РФ говорится: "Поражение России в войне привело к серьезным изменениям в расстановке сил ведущих мировых держав на Дальнем Востоке, а в самой России ускорило подъем революционного движения... Поражение России способствовало укреплению в регионе позиций Англии и США, поддерживавших Японию... Главными причинами поражени России явились..." и т.д. (Вооруженные силы и военное искусство России в войнах XVIII - начала XX веков. Учебник для слушателей Военной академии Генерального штаба ВС РФ. Изд. Военной академии Генерального штаба ВС РФ, М., 1998. С. 127). В не менее солидном пятитомнике по истории внешней политики России отмечается примерно то же: "В результате военного поражения царизма политические и экономические позиции на Дальнем Востоке оказались серьезно подорванными... Поражение России в войне с Японией повлияло на процесс перегруппировки великих держав на мировой арене..." (История внешней политики России. Конец XIX - начало XX века (От русско-французского союза до Октябрьской революции). М., Международные отношения, 1999. С. 182-183).
[26] Шацилло К.Ф. От Портсмутского мира к Первой мировой войне. Генералы и политика. М., "Российская политическая энциклопедия" (РОССПЭН), 2000. С. 14.