Общество "Россия-Япония":
http://ru-jp.org/

Nikolai Ovsyannikov
4th year student, Institute of Asian and African Countries, Moscow State University

REACTION OF JAPANESE SOCIETY TO OUTCOME OF THE RUSSIAN-JAPANESE WAR (BASED ON DIARIES OF ARCHBISHOP NIKOLAI JAPANESE AND JAPANESE SOURCES)

This study addresses some specific features of the socio-political situation in Japan following the end of the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-05. In our view, this subject has not been properly studied in either Russian or Western historiography and the import of the events that occurred in Japan in the fall of 1905 have not been fully evaluated. This paper purports to bridge the gap to a certain extent.

Without delving into the details of the military operations of the Russian-Japanese war, it should be stated that it ended in a convincing victory for Japan, confirmed by the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of August 1905. By that treaty, Japan received many gains, such as considerable new territories and economic and political advantages in North-Eastern Asia. In fact, one can say that Japan gained more than it could hope to gain, considering the actual situation both inside the country and on the battlefields.

As soon as the news of the peace treaty reached the country, however, a powerful wave of protest swept Japan. The movement of protests against the peace treaty rallied up to several million people in a very short time, according to various estimates. It was this seemingly inadequate reaction of the Japanese to the results of the victorious war with Russia that engaged our attention to the problem.

A few words about the sources used for this study. Underlying many of the conclusions made here are diaries left behind by a Russian Orthodox priest, Archbishop Nikolai the Japanese, who lived and preached in Japan for over 50 years. We focused especially on diary entries he made between 1903 and 1905, i. e., on the eve, during and after the war with Russia. Archbishop Nikolai had a perfect command of the Japanese language, society and Japan as a whole, and his observations on the events occurring in the country during the period under review are extremely interesting as well as useful. The special value of his diaries is due to the fact that the Russian missionary had been the only Russian who resided in Japan throughout the war.

Relying on a critical analysis of the diary texts, we put together a basic table with data arranged on the chronological principles under the following headings: principal events of the Russian-Japanese war; official and unofficial Japanese propaganda; western propaganda and attitudes in Japanese society in 1903-05. Thus, the table reflects a whole palette of attitudes current in society at the time and the dynamic of their changes under a range of factors, such as the course of combat operations, the government public-opinion policy and the effects of propaganda by the 'independent' Japanese and western press. In our opinion, correct conclusions as regards the dramatic events which unfolded in the country immediately after the end of the war can only be drawn if one analyzes the evolution of public dispositions in the country throughout the duration of hostilities.

Our analysis shows that the moods current in Japanese society during the actual hostilities were quite diverse, with people adhering to different views as regards the war. The most aggressively inclined sections, whom Archbishop Nikolai referred to as 'ultra-patriots,' vigorously supported the war effort; their position enjoying considerable backing.

This is not to say, however, that the entire society was in favor of continuing the hostilities. Not a few representatives of various social groups-from high-ranking state officials to common peasants in the provinces-were against the war with Russia and favored an earlier termination of it. Archbishop Nikolai, an adherent of friendship between the two states from the beginning, enjoyed considerable respect among these people.

The Japanese government occupied a moderate and intermediate position. While opposing excessive aggressiveness of the ultra-patriots, it pursued a policy aiming at a complete victory.

What adds to the exceptional value of Archbishop Nikolai's diaries is the fact that it sheds light on the positions of the four parties directly involved in the conflict: the Japanese government, the independent mass media, and westerners, especially the British (the UK was Japan's ally), and that of the priest himself, who expressed the views of an intelligent Russian endowed with Orthodox Christian morality and culture.

Japanese propaganda exerted a powerful influence on the mass consciousness of the people. As is clearly seen from the diaries, it was disseminated on two levels: the official and the non-official. Dissemination of official propaganda was the job of the government and mass media it controlled. In studying these materials we had the impression that its chief goal was not so much to instigate the 'militant spirit' in the Japanese as to mitigate the tension that arose in society at the start of the hostilities. Talking about the "noble" goals of the war, such as the "safeguarding of peace in the East," the government consistently stressed that the war was devoid of any racial or religious character and sought to persuade the populace to respond to events related to the war in a calmer manner.

Conversely, non-official propaganda was wielded primarily by the press that was independent of the government. Its position was more aggressive and left no place for compromise. The following main directions of non-official propaganda can be delineated: vigorous anti-Russian campaigning (the Russians were presented as the "barbarians of the 16th century" who had to be fought against in the interests of world civilization); the excessive praising of Japan's successes on the battlefields and speculation on the theme of the future peace (the Japanese were promised "Siberia till the Yenisei River" and other improbable acquisitions). Let us remind here again that unofficial propaganda ran counter to the government policy as regards public consciousness.

Western propaganda also exerted considerable influence on the consciousness of the Japanese people, above all the intellectuals. The British newspaper "Japan Daily Mail" occupied a special place among various western publications; it was edited by Frank Brinkley, a well-known specialist of Japanese history and culture.

Characteristic of western propaganda were the same theses as those used by the unofficial Japanese media. Unlike the latter, however, western propagandists were even more relentlessly disposed toward Russia and everything Russian. Whereas the Japanese, who were actually fighting the war, tried to analyze the situation in an objective manner, the western press would not even consider such an approach. Father Nikolai mentioned this more than once, voicing his indignation at the fact that the western press as a whole, and particularly the "Japan Daily Mail," acted as a center for the dissemination of lies about Russia.

It is worthwhile to compare the diametrically opposite positions of the two outstanding persons of that time: Archbishop Nikolai and Frank Brinkley. Whereas Brinkley sided with the Japanese in all matters, often ignoring the principles of objectivity associated with the profession of an historian, Archbishop Nikolai occupied a more considered position, trying to defend Orthodoxy and Russia from unjust condemnations. Frequently, they engaged in direct polemics, fighting for the minds of the Japanese public. For all that there was much in common in the destinies of these two people. Both arrived in Japan in the 1860s and both contributed to the progress of western civilization in the country. Both men were enchanted with Japan and were very friendly toward it. Finally, the two irreconcilable opponents died in the same year, 1912.

Another group of sources used for the present study was the Japanese press of the day. In particular, we used materials - especially those published in September 1905, the height of the events under review - from the influential "Osaka Asahi-Shimbun," a paper which was neither pro-government, nor obviously radical, and which was a spokesman for the interests of the merchant and industrial bourgeoisie of Osaka.

Analysis of material carried by the Japanese newspapers, the most important instrument of the formation of social-political atmosphere in the country, revealed, firstly, the public's response to events and, secondly, the causes underlying these reactions (both of which are the primary concern of this research).

The texts that appeared in the "Osaka Asahi-Shinbun" in September 1905 show vividly that even this mildly radical newspaper gave the peace treaty the most hostile reception, referring to it as act of treason or criminal mistake. The paper openly charged the government with state treason and utter non-professionalism. The main targets for the attacks were cabinet members and, especially, the minister foreign affairs, Komura, who headed the Japanese delegation, and members of the emperor's Privy Council.

The paper reacted as emotionally to the anti-government actions, usually siding with the protestors and censuring the government for too harsh a treatment of the disorderly crowds (for example, in Tokyo), the introduction of censorship and violations of constitutional liberties (freedom of expression, assembly, etc.).

In examining the texts, we formed an impression that this kind of sharp reaction was typical for the majority of the Japanese print media. As for the "Osaka Asahi-Shimbun," its intractable stand resulted in a temporary closure by the censors, a fate it shared with quite a few other influential publications.

Let us now review what exactly rocked Japan in the fall of 1905. The very first reports about the terms of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty aroused a tsunami of protests throughout Japan. Within days, the anti-government movement engulfed most of the country, with public rallies and protest demonstrations taking place in all regions. The peak of violence was an open uprising which came to be known as Hibia jiken ('Incident in Hibiya').

On September 5, leaders of ultra patriotic and nationalist groups organized an all-Japanese meeting on the occasion of the peace treaty with Russia, which heard sharp criticism of government policy and the terms of the Portsmouth accord. Seeing that the rally was rapidly developing into an anti-government event, the police attempted to ban the rally; the ensuing fighting grew into an uprising that engulfed the entire city. The rioters raided police booths, stations and residences of cabinet ministers, and burnt Christian churches and streetcar stocks. The riots continued till September 7, during which time there was practically no authority in the city.

The rampaging anarchy in the capital forced the government to resort to harsh measures. A state of emergency was proclaimed and army units and emperor's guards were called in. Severe censorship was introduced throughout the country and several newspapers and magazines whose aggressive editorial policy contributed to growing social tension were closed down. The anti-government protests were not limited to the capital. Similar riots swept the country from the east to the south-west, with the number of participants estimated from several hundred thousand to a few million people. The situation was ultimately restored only in early October, and on October 9, the state of emergency was lifted.

What added poignancy to the conflict was the traditional belief that the Japanese had always been loyal to the authorities. Only a few instances in the entire history of Japan are associated with open mass and simultaneous acts against the government. Among them one can mention, in our view, the uprisings in Yamashiro (15th century), Shimabara (17th century), and the rice revolts in the fall of 1918.

What compelled the winning nation and its people known for their patience to express their displeasure in such a violent form? Our study led to following conclusions with regard to the unrest of the fall of 1905.

It is no secret that prolonged hostilities saw the sharp deterioration of the living standards of the majority of Japanese people. Yet the building of frustration in society was not, in our opinion, the result of the worsening of the quality of life (as Japanese researches Sumia Mikio , Koyama Hirotake and Asada Mitsuteru tend to maintain). It should be recalled that nearly a year before the beginning of the war, a vigorous propaganda campaign was launched primarily by the press that was independent of the government. It is true that the mass media in Japan expressed the interests of different political and economic groups, but most of the publications were under the strong influence of such ultra patriotic organizations as "Tairo: doshikai" ('Anti-Russian League') and "Kokuryu:kai" ("Society of Black Dragon" or "Amur River Society").

One may say that at a certain point even before the start of the hostilities, the ultra patriots had managed to establish a de facto control of public opinion in the country. Using the mass media, the ultra patriots presented to Japanese society their views on foreign policy in general and on Japan's objectives in the war against Russia, in particular. The non-official Japanese press promised the people colossal advantages from the war, territories in "Siberia up to the Yenisei" and billions in indemnity payments. Although the terms of the Portsmouth peace treaty were extremely beneficial for Japan, it could by no means satisfy all such claims, claims which, thanks to the ultra patriots, many people had come to believe in.

Instead of territories in Siberia the Japanese ended up with 270.000 killed and wounded, a post-war economic depression, a 100-fold increase in direct taxation alone, unemployment, skyrocketing prices, and greater injury rates in industry. This discrepancy between propaganda and the actual outcome of the war was, in our view, the chief cause of tension and displeasure in society, which ultimately led to mass protests.

However, displeasure and frustration were not enough to arouse such a storm of disobedience. It should be stressed here again that the unrest of September-October 1905 was staged-managed by the ultra patriots. Thus, very active participants in the rally in Tokyo's Hibia were radical politician Toyama Mitsuru from "Kokuryu:kai," Kono Hironaka and O:gawa Heikichi from "Dokukai" ("Society of Joint Attack"). Actively supporting the movements against the peace treaty was the largest opposition party Kenseihonto: ('Party of constitutional bases') headed by O:kuma Shigenobu, a prominent Japanese politician of the time.

What were the goals that these people pursued by embarking on a path of open confrontation with the powers that be? The ultra-patriot party believed that large-scale territorial gains were the top objective of the war with Russia, and the Portsmouth accord failed completely in satisfying these claims. The ultra patriots skillfully used their considerable influence in society in order to push the moderate cabinet of Katsura Taro: toward the war in 1904. When the government realized that its resources for waging the war had been exhausted, it ignored the ultra-patriots' positions, seeking an end to the hostilities on what seemed to it acceptable terms.

Naturally, this turn did not suit the ultra patriots, and they used the complex social and political situation in the country to induce the government to heed their demands. Having succeeded in making the government follow their foreign-policy line before, the ultra patriots were determined to preserve their influence on political decision-making. In fact, they were even prepared to remove the Katsura Taro: cabinet from office (calls to this effect were made by the "Kenseihonto:" newspaper, for example) so that the next cabinet would reckon more with their positions.

These designs of the ultra patriots were about to come true when, at the critical moment, the government found the strength to repulse the rioters. Resorting to both the administrative levers and the armed forces at their disposal, the government suppressed the unrest within one month, and in early October the movement against the peace treaty ceased to exist. This time, the ultra patriots' attempt to force the government to adopt their expansionist foreign-policy program ended in failure.

The material examined in the course of this study makes it possible to make the following assumption. It was the activities of the ultra patriots, who were dissatisfied with the Portsmouth peace treaty that ignored their interests, that produced the unstable situation in Japanese society after the end of the Russian-Japanese war. The economic and social contradictions in the wake of the war contributed to the complication of the situation (but were rather a background of the events of the fall of 1905) and were used by the ultra patriots in their attempts to replace the Katsura cabinet.

It seems appropriate to conclude, therefore, that the Hibia jiken and other disturbances of 1905 were just another stage in the confrontation between the radical champions of active military expansion and the more moderate and pragmatic politicians working for the peaceful inclusion of Japan in the world political context. This struggle had its beginning in the second half of the 19th century when, in the course of the Meiji reforms in Japan's social life, many different political trends manifested their presence.

The ultra patriots continued to gather strength throughout the 19th century. They stepped up their activities during the Japanese-Chinese war of 1894-95 and, especially, during the war with Russia. The year 1905 proved a test of strength for radical politicians seeking to impose their foreign-policy course on the Japanese leadership. The resources mobilized by the two sides proved unequal. Whereas the ultra patriots managed to activate several million people, the army remained loyal to the government while society at large had been exhausted by the war and was not up to a drawn-out struggle against the powers that be.

Following the setback they suffered in September 1905, the ultra patriots receded into the shadow of political life for the next 20 years, while a moderate political course known as Taisho: Democracy (1912-1924) established itself in Japan. Beginning in the late 1920s, however, the ultra patriots resumed their active involvement in Japanese politics. They had learned from their past mistakes and had managed to considerably consolidate their positions in the country thanks primarily to the support of the army, where their adherents had come to hold nearly all leading posts, and of the major zaibatsu, or trading and industrial monopolies.

The struggle for political supremacy between the radical and moderate political groups reached a climax in the 1930s when, as a result of several revolts and provocations, the ultra patriots succeeded in moving to the position at the helm of Japanese politics. It was the dominance of radical ultra patriots in Japanese political life that, in our view, ultimately led to the Pacific War in the period that followed.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that all events related to Hibia jiken should be regarded in a wider historical context. This approach makes it possible to look beyond concrete manifestations of popular indignation and examine an enduring historical tendency that determined Japan's development for several decades.